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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD CONSTRUE UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-l-ll(5)(e) 
BY ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE. 
The Court should not interpret Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e) outside of its plain 
language. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) (2007) provides: 
(1) A water right appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of the land 
unless the grantor: 
(a) specifically reserves the water right or any part of the water right 
in the land conveyance document; 
(b) conveys a part of the water right in the land conveyance 
document; or 
(c) conveys the water right in a separate conveyance document prior 
to or contemporaneously with the execution of the land conveyance 
document. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(5) (2007) provides, in part: 
(d) If a grantor conveys part of the water right in a land conveyance 
document pursuant to Subsection (l)(b), the portion of the water right not 
conveyed is presumed to be reserved by the grantor. 
(e) If the land conveyed constitutes only a portion of the authorized place 
of use for the water right, the amount of the appurtenant water right that 
passes to the grantee shall be proportionate to the conveyed portion of the 
authorized place of use. 
It is undisputed that the Trust Deed encumbered only 158 acres of real property, 
and that the 160 Acre Feet was authorized for use on 200 acres. See Certificate of 
{00133960.DOC / 2 
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Beneficial Use, R519-520. Thus, Plaintiffs appear to concede that based on a literal 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(5)(e), only 126.4 acre feet of the 160 Acre 
Feet could have been appurtenant to the Property. See Brief of Appellees, at 19. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that construing Section 73-1-1 l(5)(e) by its plain 
meaning would create an absurd result, and the Court should therefore construe the 
statute to mean only that portion of the authorized place owned by the Grantor. Id. Thus, 
Plaintiffs argue that the statute should read as follows: 
(e) If the land conveyed constitutes only a portion of the authorized place 
of use for the water right, the amount of the appurtenant water right that 
passes to the grantee shall be proportionate to the conveyed portion of the 
authorized place of use owned by the Grantor. 
This argument is without merit. First, although Eagle Mountain disagrees that the 
result of Plaintiffs' scenario was "absurd," the statute would not produce an absurd result 
in this matter. If the Court interprets Section 73-1-1 l(5)(e) by its plain meaning, 126.4 
acre feet of the 160 Acre Feet would have been appurtenant to the Property. The 33.6 
acre feet of water rights that were not encumbered by the Trust Deed would have passed 
from EML to Circle of Builders to Eagle Mountain free and clear of the Trust Deed. 
There is nothing absurd about this result. 
In addition, Plaintiffs' suggested interpretation of the statute could produce an 
even more undesirable result than the scenario suggested by Plaintiffs. For example, 
assume that Person A acquires 160 acre feet of water rights by water right deed, which 
water rights are approved for use on 200 acres. In conjunction with the acquisition of the 
4 
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water rights, Person A acquires 1 of the 200 acres of real property on which the water 
right is approved for use. Person A intends to transfer the 160 acre feet of water rights to 
a municipality for use in another development project. Prior to Person A transferring the 
160 acre feet of water rights to the municipality, Person A grants a deed of trust against 
the one acre of real property, but inadvertently fails to reserve the water rights. By 
Plaintiffs' rationale, because the one acre of real property represents 100% of the 
approved place of use of the water right owned by Person A, by operation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-1-11(1), the trust deed would encumber the entire 160 acre feet of water. This 
is clearly an absurd result. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that only 126.4 acre feet of the 160 
Acre Feet was appurtenant to the Property. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining 
that the entire 160 Acre Feet was encumbered by the Trust Deed pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §73-1-11. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE PARTIES INTENT WITH RESPECT 
TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE TRUST DEED. 
The trial court erred in determining that the phrase "all water rights . . . thereunto 
belong5' was not ambiguous with respect to whether the 160 Acre Feet was included 
within the meaning of the phrase. 
In Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, the Utah Supreme Court 
articulated Utah law concerning contractual ambiguity as follows: 
5 
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[C]ontractual ambiguity can occur in two different contexts: (1) facial 
ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity 
with regard to the intent of the contracting parties. The first context 
presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The second 
context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the 
contract is facially ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties1 intentions 
should be admitted. Thus, before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a 
court must make a determination of facial ambiguity. 
The Dairies court clarified the two-part rule to determine facial ambiguity 
developed in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). See id. 
fflf 25-27. First, the court must consider any reliable evidence about whether the 
agreement is facially ambiguous. See id. Second, if the court finds ambiguity, it must 
ensure that any contrary interpretations of the agreement "'are reasonably supported by 
the language of the contract.'" Id. (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268). Moreover, when 
determining whether the plain language is ambiguous, the court shall "attempt to 
harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms." See Glenn v. Reese, 2009 
UT 80, \ 10, 225 P.3d 185 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 
3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599). To harmonize the provisions of a contract, the Court must 
"examine the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a 
reasonable construction of the contract as a whole to determine the parties' intent." 
Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, H 19, 121 P.3d 57. 
Here, in order for the trial court to determine whether the phrase "all water rights . 
. . thereunto belonging" was facially ambiguous, the trial court was required to consider 
the Warranty Deed and Water Right Deeds from Berrys to EML. Ward, 907 P.2d at 264; 
6 
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See also Brief of Appellees, at 11 ("The three Water Right Deeds and Assignments from 
the Berrys to EML were recorded simultaneous with the Berrys' Warranty Deed to the 
Land."). R621, 540-545. 
The Warranty Deed, which was recorded five days prior to the Trust Deed, 
contains similar form language to the Trust Deed, which states: "Together with all rights, 
privileges and appurtenances belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto " Id. 
However, instead of relying on the form language in the Warranty Deed to convey the 
160 Acre Feet, the Berrys executed the three Water Rights Deeds and Assignments, 
which specifically detailed the 160 Acre Feet by water right number and change 
application number. The purpose and result of the Water Rights Deeds was to avoid the 
ambiguity with respect to what water rights were being conveyed to EML by Berrys. 
Yet, despite being aware of the specific water right number and change application 
number for the 160 Acre Feet, the Trust Deed does not include any specific reference to 
the 160 Acre Feet. In contrast, the Promissory Note, which is referenced in the Trust 
Deed, states that it is to be secured by a first mortgage on the following: 
See "Exhibit A" attached hereto 
Parcel I.D. No.: pt. 59-019-0001 
Parcel I.D. No. 56-007-0012 
Commonly known as: 2455 North Lake Mountain Road Eagle Mountain, 
UT 84043 
And water shares as follows: 
450 a.f. water right no.: 57-1069 
250 a.f. water right no 1:57-7626 
150 a.f. water right no.: 57-10195 
7 
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275 a.f. water right no.: 57-10169 
R447-51,R576-79. 
Taken together, the Promissory Note and Water Right Deeds create a facial 
ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the phrase "all water rights . . . thereunto 
belong." 
Based on the reliable evidence, the most plausible interpretation of the phrase "all 
water rights . . . thereunto belong" is that it was included as form language and was not 
intended to encumber any specific water rights. Therefore, because the meaning of the 
phrase "all water rights . . . thereunto belong" is facially ambiguous, the trial court erred 
in excluding evidence that the parties did not intend the phrase "all water rights . . . 
thereunto belong" to include the 160 Acre Feet. 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. 73-1-11 SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO 
CONVEY THE 160 ACRE FEET IN CONTRAST TO THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES. 
As noted by Plaintiffs, "[t]he legislature appears to have enacted Section 73-1-11 
in order to provide a set of default rules governing the circumstances under which, and 
the extent to which, water rights pass as part of a conveyance of land where the parties to 
the conveyance have failed to address those issues specifically in the instruments of 
conveyance." Brief of Appellees, at 17. 
In order to provide a clear method to exclude water rights from a land conveyance, 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) (2007) provides, in part, that "[a] water right appurtenant to 
8 
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land shall pass to the grantee of the land unless the grantor: . . . (b) conveys a part of the 
water right in the land conveyance document...." 
In other words, where a party intentionally conveys part of a water right, it is the 
presumption that the parties did not intend not to convey the other part. In this case, 
although EML did not specifically convey part of the 160 Acre Feet in the Trust Deed, 
the land conveyance documents detail certain water rights which were to be conveyed as 
part of the land conveyance documents. Specifically, the Promissory Note states that it is 
to be secured by a first mortgage on the 1125 Acre Feet. See Promissory Note, R447-51, 
R576-79. 
Thus, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(l)(b), the presumption should 
be that Eagle Mountain Lots did not intend to convey the 160 Acre Feet. Accordingly, 
the Court should interpret Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 l(l)(b) to exclude water rights from 
passing as appurtenant rights when the land conveyance documents when any water 
rights are conveyed as part of the land conveyance documents. 
In addition, as noted by Plaintiffs, Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) is intended to 
address situation in which the parties do not address water rights in the conveyance 
documents. Thus, to the extent that the Court determines that the parties intentionally 
excluded the 160 Acre Feet from the Trust Deed, the Court should not construe Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-11(1) to transfer water rights contrary to the clear intent of the parties. 
{00133960.DOC / 2 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS ON THEIR CLAIM FOR 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER. 
The trial court rejected Eagle Mountain's good-faith-transferee-for-value theory 
on the grounds that Eagle Mountain (1) did not assert it as a defense in its Answer, (2) 
presented no evidence that it gave value for the water rights transferred to it by Circle of 
Builders or that it was an innocent purchaser, (3) submitted no admissible evidence as to 
the amount of value it claimed to have given, and (4) failed to show that value was given 
to the debtor. Ruling at 10-11, R886-87. The trial court erred in granting of summary 
judgment on each of these grounds. 
First, with respect to Eagle Mountain's failure to specifically plead good faith 
transferee as an affirmative defense, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c) should be liberally construed to afford parties the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. In Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963), the Court held: 
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., requires that 
affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to have 
the issues to be tried clearly framed. But it is not the only rule in the book 
of Rules of Civil Procedure. They must all be looked to in the light of their 
even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure 
to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are 
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. 
See also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 668 (Utah,1985) (reversing the grant of 
summary judgment where respondent did not argue that it had been surprised or 
10 
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disadvantaged by failure to specifically plead an affirmative defense, but argued only that 
the Rules of Civil Procedure precluded appellants' defense.). 
Plaintiffs were on notice that Eagle Mountain intended to assert a defense that it 
was a good faith transferee for value and that Plaintiffs had an opportunity to respond. 
Specifically, Eagle Mountain argued in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment that Eagle Mountain was a good faith transferee for value. The 
relevant portion of the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
states: 
Third, even if the transfer is avoidable, Eagle Mountain is entitled to a lien upon 
and interest in the 160 Acre Feet that is superior to the interest of Plaintiffs. Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-9(4) states: 
Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a 
good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the 
debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: (a) a lien on or a right to retain any 
interest in the asset transferred . . . . (emphasis added). 
In this case, Eagle Mountain was a good-faith transferee. Thus, to the extent that 
the transfer was voidable, Eagle Mountain would retain a lien on the assets 
transferred. 
Id. at 4. 
Moreover, although Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment that Eagle Mountain contends that it is a good 
faith purchaser for value, Plaintiffs do not argue that Eagle Mountain waived the defense 
by not asserting it as an affirmative defense in its Answer. Id. at 20. Accordingly, 
because Plaintiffs had an opportunity to respond to the defense, the trial court erred in 
11 
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granting summary judgment based on Eagle Mountain's failure to specifically assert the 
defense in its Answer. 
There is also ample evidence that Eagle Mountain gave value to Circle of Builders 
in the form of water right entitlements. Most notably, it is undisputed that Circle of 
Builders conveyed the 160 Acre Feet to Eagle Mountain City. See Brief of Appellees at 7 
(f7); R350. In exchange, Circle of Builders received a contractual right to utilize the 160 
Acre Feet. The Judgment specifically refers to this right as "banked entitlements". R912-
913. Regardless of how the parties characterize this right, it is clear that Eagle Mountain 
provided value to Circle of Builders in exchange for 160 Acre Feet. 
Accordingly, at a minimum, the trial court erred in not finding that a material issue 
of fact existed as to whether Eagle Mountain was a good faith transferee for value. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/appellant Eagle Mountain City respectfully request that the Court: (1) 
vacate the summary judgment; (2) order that the Trust Deed is ambiguous and that parol 
evidence may and shall be considered to determine the intent of the parties with respect 
to the 160 Acre Feet; (3) order that, at most, 126.4 acre feet of the 160 Acre Feet were 
appurtenant to the Property and therefore subject to the Trust Deed; and that remaining 
33.6 acre feet transferred to Eagle Mountain City were not subject to or encumbered by 
the Trust Deed; (4) vacate the summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for 
fraudulent transfer; and (5) order that Plaintiffs are not entitled to foreclose "banked 
entitlements." 
12 
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Respectfully submitted this jZpday of November, 2011. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Professional Corf oration 
By; 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Jeremy R. Cook 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
City of Eagle Mountain 
{00133960.DOC / 2 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY was hereby 
served via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, on this <^P day of November, 2011 to 
the following: 
James C. Swindler 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
Gateway Tower West 
15 West South Temple, #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 •** 
Wayne G. Petty 
Moyle and Draper, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
{00133960.DOC / 2 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
